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Religion in the Yugoslav successor states at the beginning of the 21
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With the turn of the century, a new stage began in the religious life in the Yugoslav successor 
states. In the previous decade, religious institutions and religious leaders had often played an 
active role in supporting or at least justifying the nationalist and irredentist policies of their 
respective government. In exchange, political leaders helped the church―and for that matter 
the mosque―to recover from the damages suffered under the communist regime and 
ultimately to acquire a privileged position in the state. As Mitja Velikonja noticed, 
commenting on the alliance between religions institutions and state power, “national, 
political, and, ultimately, military mobilization of these societies could not be achieved 
without religious legitimation, while, on the other hand, religious communities were unable to 
achieve their goals without the active support of nationalist parties and politics in general.”1 
Five years after Dayton, with the June 1999 Military Technical Agreement between Serbia 
and KFOR, concluding the war in the FR Yugoslavia, and the August 2000 Ohrid Agreement, 
the nationalist conflicts in the Western Balkans finally came to an end. About the same time, 
there occurred among both political and church leaders a number of “staff changeovers”: in 
1997 Franjo Kuharić, the Croatian archbishop and true ally of President Franjo Tuđman 
deceased and was succeeded by Josip Bozanić; in 1999 Franjo Tuđman himself died; in 
Serbia in 2000, Slobodan Milošević was dethroned and replaced by Vojislav Koštunica. The 
consequences of these changes were not in all cases identical and not always unfavourable to 
the churches. However, there was nowhere a return to the close cooperation, not to say 
complicity of religious and party leaders. The religious institutions had now acquired a 
position of power that enabled them to focus on their evangelic mission―the dissemination of 
the traditional moral values proper to their creed, including love of one’s neighbour, while 
remaining, to be sure, the conscience of the nation. They did so with such a zeal that in some 
of the Yugoslav successor states the secular nature of the state was seriously endangered.    
 
Consolidation of the legal status 
 
After the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the religious institutions―Christian and Muslim 
alike―were facing the complex task of reacquiring the legal position, moral authority and 
political influence, the (immovable) properties and in some cases the jurisdiction they had lost 
under the communist regime. As the new independent states considered religious freedom as 
an aspect of the democratic societies they were eager to establish, religious freedom in the 
framework of a secular state was constitutionally granted to all citizens in each of them. Most 
of the legal provisions were initiated already in the 1990s, when the new constitutions were 
voted.
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 Although these constitutions explicitly proclaim the separation of state and church and 
reject religious discrimination, in practice in most of the successor states one particular 
religious institution enjoys a privileged position as a “traditional creed”―which, by the way, 
is not uncommon in several Western countries either. This is most discernibly the case with 
the Catholic Church in Croatia and the Orthodox Church in Serbia and Macedonia, to which a 
crucial role in the nation and state building process is attributed. This privileged position 
transpires most strikingly from the methodical and arresting presence of representatives of 
those “traditional churches” at various official occasions, which is a symbolic, but 
nevertheless significant infringement of the proclaimed secular character of the state. 
The legal provisions regulating the position of the religious institutions were amended or 
expounded in the 2000s. In Serbia the Constitution reserves no privileged place to the 
Orthodox Church. However, Article 10 of the Law on Churches and Religious Communities 
(Zakon o crkvama i verskim zajednicama), voted on 20 April 2006 by the Serbian Assembly 
after long public debates and after the text was endorsed by the Patriarchate (!), makes a 
distinction between, on the one hand, “traditional churches and traditional religious 
communities that have in Serbia an age-old continuity and whose status as a legal subject is 
based on particular laws”, and, on the other hand, “confessional communities”.3 Traditional 
churches are the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Slovak 
Evangelical Church (Augsburg Confession), the Reformed Christian Church and the 
Evangelical Christian Church (Eventually, after protests from Bucharest, the Romanian 
Orthodox Church was added to the list.) Traditional religious communities are the Jewish and 
the Muslim communities, which cannot be termed as “churches”. Article 11 of the Law, 
descriptively rather than prescriptively, points out “the extraordinary historical, state building 
and civilizational role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the formation, the safeguarding and 
the development of the identity of the Serbian nation” and actually singles out the Serbian 
Orthodox Church as a primus inter pares.  
So-called “confessional communities” are all the others ―mainly neo-Protestant or 
Evangelistic churches as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, Methodists, Seventh-Day 
Adventists and suchlike―which, at variance with the “churches and religious institutions”, 
have to apply for official registration. Traditional churches and religious communities are not 
obligated to register―a discrimination that in fact legalizes a kind of hierarchical distinction 
between “traditional churches and communities” and “religious confessions”. Obviously the 
provision that “confessional communities” need to register aims at protecting more 
specifically the Serbian Orthodox Church against the neo-Protestant communities, which 
make converts mainly among the Orthodox flock. The “traditional churches and religious 
communities” as a rule do not proselytize among each other. Registration can be refused, as 
provided in Article 3 of the Law on Churches and Religious Communities, which echoes 
Article 44 of the Constitution: “The Constitutional Court may ban a religious community only 
if its activities infringe the right to life, right to mental and physical health, the rights of child, 
right to personal and family integrity, public safety and order, or if it incites religious, national 
or racial intolerance.” In practice, neo-Protestant churches are frequently branded as “sects” 
and prevented from registration, or deprived of many of their rights.
4
 Similar restrictions on 
“sects”, however, exist in many European countries, although they are not applied in a similar 
discriminatory way; the US is as a rule more tolerant. Most protests against violations of the 
religious freedom of neo-Protestant communities seem to come from organizations in the US. 
Article 41 of the Croatian Constitution states that “All religious communities shall be equal 
before the law and shall be separated from the State.” In the 2002 Law on the Legal Position 
of Religious Communities (Zakon o pravnom položaju vjerskih zajednica) no denominations 
are mentioned by name. Article 5, clause 1 of the Law specifies that religious communities 
can gain legal status when they become enlisted in the register, and they can get enlisted in 
the register (Evidencija) upon making an official application.  Clause 2 also states that only 
communities that worked for five years as legal entities can apply for obtaining an official 
legal status. This means that a religious community is not obligated to apply for a legal status, 
but if it fails to do it does not have the same rights as those that did register..  
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, relations between the state and the religious communities are 
regulated by the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which came as Annex 4 with the 
1995 Dayton Agreement and was agreed upon by the signatories. Amendments were made in 
2009 under the supervision of the international community. Both entities in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, created by Dayton Agreement, the (Bosniak-Croat) Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, have additional constitutions of their own. The 
Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina grants religious freedom, 
paralleling the rather unspecific phrasing of the Dayton Agreement.
5
 The 1992 Constitution of 
the Republika Srpska proclaimed in Article 10 the freedom and equality of all religious 
creeds, but specified in paragraph 3 of Article 28 that “The Serbian Orthodox Church shall be 
the church of the Serb people and other people of Orthodox religion.” Paragraph 4 of Article 
28, however, stating that “[t]he state financially supports the Orthodox Church, cooperates 
with it in all domains, and particularly with the end of preserving, tending and developing the 
cultural, traditional and other spiritual values” was removed by Amendment LXXII after the 
conclusion of the Dayton Agreement.
6
  
The 2004 Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Position of Churches and Religious 
Communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina stipulates, among other things, that the state may not 
accord the status of state religion nor that of state church or religious community to a church 
or any religious community, that no church or religious community or their officials may 
obtain any special privileges from the state as compared to any other church or religious 
community or their officials, nor participate formally in political institutions, that no laws and 
doctrines of churches and religious communities shall have any civil-legal effect or shall be 
forcibly imposed by the public authorities. Newly formed churches and religious communities 
acquire legal personality by the act of registration.
7
  
In Macedonia the Constitution was amended in a way that at least formally put an end to the 
legal favourisation of the Macedonian Orthodox Church as a “primus inter pares”. Article 19 
of the first 1992 Macedonian Constitution stipulated that  
 
The freedom of religious confession is guaranteed. The right to express one's faith 
freely and publicly, individually or with others is guaranteed. The Macedonian 
Orthodox Church and other religious communities and groups are separate from the 
state and equal before the law. The Macedonian Orthodox Church and other religious 
communities and groups are free to establish schools and other social and charitable 
institutions, by way of a procedure regulated by law.  
 
Mentioning only the Macedonian Orthodox Church by name, the suggestion was made that it 
occupies a more prominent position in the state vis-à-vis the other religious communities and 
groups remained nameless. Implementing Article 19, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the 2001 Ohrid 
Agreement
8
, and even enlarging them to additional religious communities not mentioned in 
the Agreement, Article 19 of the Macedonian Constitution was by the end of 2001 amended 
as follows:  
 
1. The Macedonian Orthodox Church, as well as the Islamic Religious Community in 
Macedonia, the Catholic Church, Evangelical Methodist Church, the Jewish 
Community and other Religious communities and groups are separate from the state 
and equal before the law. 
2. The Macedonian Orthodox Church, as well as the Islamic Religious Community in 
Macedonia, the Catholic Church, Evangelical Methodist Church, the Jewish 
Community and other Religious communities and groups are free to establish schools 
and other social and charitable institutions, by way of a procedure regulated by law.
9
 
 
Relations between the state and the religious institutions and communities in Macedonia were 
finally regulated in the same pluralist spirit by the 2007 Law on the legal status of church, 
faith community and religious group (Zakon o pravnata položba na crkva,verska zaednica i 
religiozna grupa).
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Both the 2006 Montenegrin and the 2008 Kosovo Constitutions, stating that the state is 
secular and neutral in matters of religious beliefs. 
Thus, the constitutions of all Yugoslav successor state emphasize the secular character of the 
republic that means the strict separation of church and state, in combination with an almost 
unlimited religious freedom. In practice, however, in most of them there is a “traditional 
church” that for historical reasons occupies a particular, privileged position. The extent to 
which this privileged position is explicitized in the constitution itself in some cases seems to 
depend on the scope of external pressure. As all Yugoslav successor states aspired or still 
aspire one day to become members of the European Union (EU), they have all tended to adapt 
their legislation to EU criteria. Those constitutions appear to be the most liberal that are 
designed in circumstances of considerable dependence on―or pressure from―the 
international community, as for instance in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, in Macedonia after 
2001 and in Kosovo in the years preceding independence in 2008. Conversely, the privileging 
of one particular religious institution is most noticeable in the constitutions designed or voted 
by parliaments that were reluctant or even hostile to foreign interventions as for instance the 
Serbian parliaments in Serbia and the Republika Srpska. The amendments to the constitutions 
of the Republika Srpska and of Macedonia are the result of direct intervention of the Office of 
the High Commissioner in Sarajevo and of the EU and the US mediators respectively in 
Ohrid. Whether these legal provisions are actually implemented or not also seems to depend 
to a large extent on international monitoring. 
 
Recovery and more 
 
The first concern of the religious institutions after independence was to restore the material 
and moral position they had had in society before the establishment of the communist regime. 
The concordats (agreements with the Vatican) concluded by Croatia in 1996 and 1998 and by 
Bosnia –Herzegovina in 2006 greatly restored the competences of the Catholic Church in the 
country and the entity not merely to an extent considered normal in Western secular states, 
but actually consolidated a process of increasing de-secularization of Croat society. In 
Croatia, a wide autonomy was granted to the Catholic Church; religious education in schools, 
was introduced in 1991, the church acquired access to the army, the police, hospitals, prisons, 
the media, and so on. Religious education in schools was on a voluntary basis, but pupils who 
did not attend the classes reportedly were discriminated against or ostracized. Catholic 
catechism teachers would be paid by the state; the state would also take care of the 
maintenance of church buildings. The archbishopric was entitled to open its own schools, high 
schools, seminaries and universities that were to be co-financed by the state; these church 
schools would grant valid diplomas. A marriage performed in the church was accepted as 
valid by the state authorities, as was an ecclesiastical annulment of a marriage. Church-issued 
certificates of baptism had the same validity as state-issued birth certificates.
11
 In 1998, an 
additional agreement was reached, stipulating that the state would pay a part of the salaries of 
priests and other people employed by the church.
12
 The favours offered to the Catholic 
Church in education, political and social life enabled the church to embark on activities that 
were then seen by many as a form of proselytism
13
, the more so as an agreement with the 
other religious communities was reached only in 2002 with the Law on the Legal Status of 
Religious Communities (Zakon o pravnom položaju vjerskih zajednica).  
The 1998 Concordat provided for the restitution of all Catholic Church property (mainly land 
and buildings), confiscated by the communist regime after 1945, or compensation of the 
Church when restitution was impossible.
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 In 2003 the church asked for a property restitution 
worth about hundred million euro. In 2004, it had received about 30 per cent of it. Although 
many properties have not yet been restituted―and probably never will as many local 
authorities are opposed to it― in 2005 the Catholic Church in Croatia was already among the 
five wealthiest corporations in the country, exceeded only by oil and communications 
companies.
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 The Church does not pay taxes on their income as all other citizens do.   
In 1997, when Archbishop Franjo Kuharić retired (1970-1997), the HDZ (Hrvatska 
Demokratska Zajednica, Croat Democratic Union), had lost its main supporter. His successor, 
Josip Bozanić, brought in a more moderate and ecumenical accent which was to overcome the 
perception of a church too blatantly involved in party politics and worldly affairs. When 
President Franjo Tuđman deceased in December 1999, the Croat Catholic Church lost its 
chief ally. In 2000, the HDZ for the first time since 1990 lost the parliamentary elections and 
had to cede power to a centrum-left coalition. From 2003 to 2011, the HDZ was in power 
again. Although the HDZ too had become more restrained, neither the social democrats, who 
ruled from 2000 to 2003, nor the current centrum-left Kukuriku coalition (2011- ) have dared 
seriously challenge the position of power the Catholic Church has established in the 1990s. 
In Slovenia the Catholic Church initially did not acquire the same prominent position in 
society as it did in Croatia. Slovenia had a sound secular tradition, rooted in the Reformation 
and in 19
th
-century anticlerical liberalism. At variance with the situation in Croatia, a large 
majority of Slovenians is opposed to church involvement in politics.
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 This does not mean, 
however, that there is no conservative current in Slovenian society, which is in favour of a 
more potent Catholic church. With the enthronement of Msgr. Franc Rode as archbishop of 
Ljubljana in 1997, this current acquired momentum. In 2000, during the short-lived cabinet of 
the central-rightist Prime Minister Andrej Bajuk
17
 among other things the introduction of 
optional obligatory classes on religion or ethics in Slovenian schools was considered.
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 These 
classes, the contents of which remained vague, were likely to be monopolized by the Catholic 
Church and therefore provoked huge resistance among uncompromising proponents of the 
separation of church and state.
19
 In addition, it was feared that optional religious instruction 
would open the door for non-Catholic students being ostracized, as often happened in 
Croatia.
20
 The eventual outcome was a compromise―an elective course called “Religions and 
Ethics”―that was, nevertheless, indicative of the influence the Catholic Church had acquired 
in Slovenia too.
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The situation in Serbia is not different from that in Croatia. Although Patriarch Pavle (1990-
2009) initially wholeheartedly supported the nationalist policy of Slobodan Milošević, the 
Serbian church failed to be rewarded immediately. Milošević and the Serbian Socialist Party 
(SPS) leadership actually still were too much of old-school communists to cede much power 
to the church. The programme of the SPS explicitly rejected clericalism, considering 
Orthodox Christianity as useful only as a “counter-ideology” to Catholicism and Islam.22 The 
Serbian Patriarchate acquired a position of power only after the fall of Milošević in October 
2000. His successor, Vojislav Koštunica, a more conventional Serbian nationalist and 
convinced Orthodox Christian, was prepared to agree upon a more prominent role of the 
Patriarchate in Serbian society. After fierce debates, religious instruction as a multi-
denominational and optional subject for students of the first grade of elementary school and 
high school was introduced by a governmental regulation published on July 27, 2001.
23
 Pupils 
could choose between “Religious Education” or “Civic Education”, or select none of them. 
The options, as Miroslava Malešević noticed, not only reflected, but actually deepened the 
dichotomy in Serbian society concerning traditional, patriarchal Serbian values and modern, 
democratic, European ones.
24
 In the course of the following years, religious instruction was 
enlarged: by 2005 both “Religious Education” and “Civic Education” received the status of 
mandatory elective subjects for the entire duration of education. The traditional churches and 
religious communities were entrusted with the organization of religious instruction in public 
schools.
25
 The Orthodox Theological Faculty was incorporated in the State University of 
Belgrade.
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 Rada Drezgić gives a long list of other encroachments of the Serbian church in 
public life: the appointment of priests to the governing boards of public companies, the 
increased presence of religious content in the media, the performance of religious ceremonies 
for the inauguration of municipality leaders, the celebration of religious services in the army, 
the establishment of a chapel in the main dormitory of the University of Belgrade, and public 
celebrations of patron saints (Slava) by institutions ranging from political parties to trade 
unions and booking and gambling companies.
27
  
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, by demand of all dominant religious communities―Croats, Muslims, 
and Serbs― religious education was introduced in 1994 already.28 In the (Bosniac-Croat) 
Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, religious instruction is an elective subject in elementary 
and secondary schools; in the Republika Srpska it is taught in elementary schools. A 
Framework Law on Elementary and Secondary Education in Bosnia-Herzegovina was agreed 
upon in 2003. Article 9 stipulates that „pupils shall attend religious classes only if latter match 
their beliefs or beliefs of their parents” and wisely adds: “Students who do not wish to attend 
religious education classes shall not in any way be disadvantaged compared to other 
students“.29  
Religious developments within the Muslim community in Bosnia-Herzegovina roughly 
follow the Croat and Serb models. The smooth cooperation of the SDA (Stranka Demokratske 
Akcije, Party for Democratic Action) with the Islamic Community reminds of the 
understanding and mutual support of the Catholic Church with the HDZ and the Serbian 
Patriarchate with the SPS.
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 Since the Islamic Community of Yugoslavia in 1993 fell apart in 
national Communities, the Islamic Community (Islamska Zajednica) of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
led by Reis-ul-ulema Mustafa Cerić (1993-2012), has become the “own” religious institution 
of the Bosnian Muslims and has increasingly been committed to the defense of the national 
interests of the Bosnian Muslims. The same year, these “Muslims in the ethnic sense” 
(Muslimani u etničkom smislu) as they were called in former Yugoslavia adopted “Bosniaks” 
(Bošnjaci, sing. Bošniak) as their official name, finally effectuating the same merging of 
nation and faith as exists among Croats and Serbs.
31
 While the Islamic Community of Bosnia-
Herzegovina provided the SDA and the Bosniacs with a national ideology, the SDA defended 
the interests of Islam and presented the Islamic Society with a moral authority that, similarly 
to what happened in Croatia and Serbia, went against the mandatory secular character of the 
state.
32
  
The Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a religious institution has pursued the 
same policy as their Croat and Serb Christian counterparts. Among the Muslim claims were 
the restoration of the religious holidays, the restitution of vakufs (immovable properties held 
by religious foundations), confiscated by the communist regime, the building of new 
mosques, the introduction of halal food in schools, hospitals, barracks and prisons and so 
on.
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 Other demands were the introduction of religious instruction in schools, of moral and 
religious consultants in the army, spaces for prayer in public buildings, the opening of a 
Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo, of religious teachers colleges in Zenica and Bihać, and 
of a number of new madrasas.
34
 Muslims religious scholars increasingly hold important public 
offices, which actually represents a violation of the principle of the separation of religion and 
state.
35
 Actually, many members of the SDA who hold important public functions have a 
religious training.  However, like the Catholic Church in Croatia and the Orthodox Church in 
Serbia, the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not almighty: the establishment of 
sharia courts was not even seriously taken into consideration and vakufs have only partly 
been restituted. A timid prohibition on the sale of alcohol in restaurants during Ramadan is 
poorly implemented.  
 
The aftermath of nationalism 
 
As religion―in the broadest sense of the word, including culture, specific historical bonds 
and suchlike―constitutes the basic component of the national identity of Bosniaks, Croats 
and Serbs, making them different nations, it is understandable that religious institutions and 
religious leaders continue have played an important role in the process of nation and state 
building even after the establishment of their respective nation states. The Serbian 
Patriarchate still considers itself as the protector of all Serbs, not only those living in the 
Republic of Serbia, but also of the those in Croatia, in the Republika Srpska in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, in Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia, actually all over the world. A 
particular Serbian “nationalized” variety of Orthodoxy called “Svetosavlje” (“Holy-
Savahood”, after Holy Sava, the early thirteenth-century founder of the Serbian church) 
stands for the merging of nation, church, and state. The Croat Catholic Church as well 
ascribes to itself the role of saviour of the Croat nation, but at the same time remains 
conscious of its belonging to a word-wide ecclesiastical organization to which it is 
accountable. The Vatican supports Croatian (and Slovenian) nationalism of a Catholic brand, 
but also exerts, together with a number of Catholic organizations abroad (for instance Pax 
Christi), a moderating―and therefore not always welcomed―influence on extreme and 
aggressive nationalism.
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 Among the Bosniaks, a pan-Islamist current has been very strong, 
but, as we saw, a nationalist interpretation of the “Bosniakhood” ultimately prevailed. 37  
Religion has also to a large extent determined the mutual perception of Bosniacs, Croats, and 
Serbs. They not only attribute a great importance to their own creed, but often also ascribe 
particular mostly negative characteristics to the others’ creeds. To the Croats, Catholicism is a 
superior European religion, which profoundly distinguishes them from "the Balkan" or 
“Byzantine” or “Asian” part of Europe.38 Orthodoxy is seen as primitive and aggressive, and 
Orthodox Christians as essentially unreliable.
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 Many Serbs consider the Catholic church as a 
major enemy, not so much for dogmatic reasons, but because they regard it as an 
internationally organized, retrograde and reactionary force, and most of all because of the 
involvement of Croatian Catholic priests in the Ustaša regime. Serbs consider their being 
(Orthodox) Christians as an undeniable indication of their Europeanness and perceive Islam 
as an even more retrograde, “Oriental” religion that is incompatible with Christianity to the 
extent that Muslims and Christians allegedly cannot live within the borders of the same 
state.
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 Both Croats and Serbs―in spite of the latters’ anti-Western rhetoric―attach a great 
importance to religious identity also because they consider their being Christians as an 
indication of Europeanness and as an argument for EU accession, while, paradoxically, the 
EU itself refuses to be identified exclusively with Christianity and insists on a religiously and 
ethnically “unmarked” European citizenship.41 And yet another paradox: as Serbian anti-
Westernism is mainly a legacy of Russian slavophilia with much deeper roots than the 1999 
NATO military intervention, Bosniaks usually appear to be less burdened with anti-Western 
feelings than the Serbs. 
In spite of a few common communiques of the Franjo Kuharić and Patriarch Pavle during the 
1992-1995 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which they openly declared themselves against the 
outrages committed by the belligerents against civilians, in fact they almost unconditionally 
supported Tuđman’s and Milošević’s nationalist and irredentist policies. Although since the 
enthronement Josip Bozanić in 1997 the Croat Catholic Church as a whole has become more 
restrained and less unanimous in its sustaining extreme forms nationalism, though the 
archbishop continues ignoring ultra-nationalistic bishops glorifying former Croat fascist 
leaders, minimizing Croat war crimes as “incidental excesses” and to justifying Croat 
“national heroes”, indicted of war crimes.42 Bozanić himself never visited the Holocaust 
memorial in the Jasenovac concentration camp. The Catholic priest Vjekoslav Lasić 
celebrated commemorative masses for Ustaša leader Ante Pavelić, but was eventually 
reprimanded..
43
  
The Serbian Patriarch Pavle initially enthusiastically supported the Milošević regime 
considered it as a genuine defender of the threatened Serbians in Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Milošević’s increasing compliance with the demands of the international 
community with regard to the Serbs in the Croatian Krajina and in Bosnia-Herzegovina was 
considered by the patriarch as treason. Pavle repeatedly defended Serbs indicted of war 
crimes and pleaded against their extradition. He disapproved of Milošević’s policy in Kosovo, 
as its failure became obvious, but was a fierce opponent of Kosovan independence. This 
attitude was shared by Artemije (1991-2010), bishop of Raška and Prizren (Kosovo), who in 
the late 1999s condemned the atrocities committed by both Serbs and Kosovars, but also 
remained firmly opposed to Kosovan independence. After the peace agreement in June 1999, 
Artemije cooperated with KFOR and UNMIK to the end of improving the living conditions of 
the Serbs that had remained in Kosovo after 1999, however avoiding contacts with the 
Kosovan authorities as much as possible. In spite of its distancing from extreme nationalism, 
the Serbian Patriarchate had not denounced its traditional anti-Western feelings and 
conservative, not to say reactionary political sympathies.  In 2003, the Patriarchate canonized 
bishop Nikola Velimirović, a notorious anti-Semite and great admirer of Dimitrije Ljotić, the 
Serbian fascist leader and collaborationist, who by the way enjoys a great popularity in 
Serbia. It appears that in Croatia nationalist extremism in the church has remained limited to 
individual priests or particular organizations that, to be sure, find a breeding ground in official 
views of the church, while in Serbia nationalist stances of representatives of the church have a 
more theological, almost mystical character and more explicitly reflect official views of the 
Patriarchate. 
 Like Bozanić in Croatia, the new Serbian patriarch, Irenej (2010- ) takes more moderate 
stances. Although he disapproves of the international recognition of the independence of 
Kosovo and defends the interests and the unity of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo 
and Croatia, he has been supportive to the pro-Western policy of the recent Serbian cabinets.  
Religion played a crucial role in the accelerated ripening process of a Bosniak national 
consciousness in the 1990s.
44
 Important additional factors behind this ripening were the 
concern to maintain the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina, perceived as the 
“fatherland” of the Bosniak nation, and the warfare and ethnic cleansing, which produced a 
strong feeling of solidarity and commonality on a religious and national basis. These factors 
events have decisively contributed to the Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
acquiring its authoritative position among the Bosniaks. However, many features that may 
strike a Western watcher as indications of a thoroughgoing Islamization of contemporary 
Bosniak society do not differ in essence from similar phenomena among Catholic and 
Orthodox Christians. Some of these features, as the massive construction of mosques, the 
wearing of headscarves by girls and women, the prohibition to drink alcohol and to eat pork 
are likely to catch the attention of a Christian observer more than the mushrooming of chapels 
and churches in Croat and Serb inhabited regions to which s/he is more acquainted. The 
financial support of Iran and Saudi-Arabia and the presence of five-six hundred or some 
thousands (according to the sources) of  “Afghans” (mujahideen)45 certainly have led to a 
more strict and in some cases even fundamentalist observing of religious obligations. 
Bosniaks probably perceived the war in Yugoslavia much more in religious terms than Croats 
and Serbs: they often labeled it a “džihad” (jihad) or “Holy War” and the term “šehid” 
(shahid) or “martyrs for the sake of faith” for Bosniak war casualties was even more 
widespread. 
46
 However, Iranian and Saudi-Arabian cultural meddling, which came with the 
arms deliveries during the war, often turned out to be alien to the Bosniak way of “being 
Muslim” and, in addition with the (more familiar) Turkish influences divided Bosniac society 
rather than permeating it with radical Islamist convictions. When the war was over, the 
international community, and in particular the US, made successful efforts to push back 
especially Iranian interference in Bosniak affairs.
47
  
In spite of Iran and Saudi-Arabia massively supporting the construction of mosques and 
madrassas in Kosovo as well, Kosovan Albanians have remained rather lukewarm Muslims. 
The large-scale deliberate destruction of Orthodox churches and monasteries in the aftermath 
of the war and during the outbursts of Albanian aggression in 2004, occurring to methodically 
to be reduced to individual terrorist acts, was nevertheless inspired by the nationalist 
determination to remove all traces of Serbian presence in Kosovo, rather than by religious 
intolerance.  
 
Religious minorities 
 
Every Yugoslav successor state contains numerous minor religious communities, which 
legally enjoy the same rights as the “dominant” religion but are actually treated as foreign 
bodies within the border of the nation state which is considered as “private property” of one 
particular ethno-religious community. In Serbia, the most important of them are listed in the 
Constitution and in the abovementioned Law on Churches and Religious Communities. These 
religious minorities are divided over nearly thirty ethnic groups.
48
 The right to religious 
instruction in schools is granted exclusively to those religious communities that are nationally 
or ethnically based, for instance Islamic instruction to Muslims/Bosniaks
49
; Catholicism to 
Croats and Hungarians et cetera. This excludes the neo-Protestants creeds, which are not 
linked to a particular ethnic group, from being entitled to religious instruction in public 
schools.
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 The Serbian Patriarchate sustains some form of dialogue with all churches and 
religious communities, except for the neo-Protestant ones, which are―not without 
reason―blamed for proselytizing and being financed from abroad.51 As they constitute less 
than 0,7%  of the population, the apprehension of the Patriarchate is probably exaggerated.
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“Protestantization”, that means conversion to one of the neo-Protestant churches, is 
particularly widespread among the Roma population.
53
 On the one hand, the mostly foreign 
priests have no bias against them and readily accept them within their communities; on the 
other hand membership of these communities allows the Roma to boost their poor social 
status. Among the Muslim population, as we observed in Kosovo, Sufi brotherhoods used to 
play a similar role.  
The situation of the Catholics―mainly of Hungarian, Croat or other non-Serb ethnic 
origin―in Serbia to some extent depends on the relations of the Serbian state and the Serbian 
Patriarchate with the Vatican and with neighbouring Catholic Croatia. After the war, the 
Serbian government, trying to escape from its position of international culprit, was disposed at 
improving relations with Rome. Representatives of the Holy Seat visited Belgrade in May 
2001 and their visit was returned by a delegation of the Serbian Patriarchate in February 
2003.
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 However, the reluctance of the Croat Catholic Church and the Vatican to publicly 
apologize for the massacres of Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia during World War II 
appeared to be an insuperable obstacle to the normalization of the relations. During his visit to 
Banja Luka in Bosnia-Herzegovina in June 2003, Pope John Paul II asked “from this city, 
marked in the course of history by so much suffering and bloodshed,  […] the Almighty God 
to have mercy on the sins committed against humanity, human dignity and freedom also by 
children of the Catholic Church, and to foster in all the desire for mutual forgiveness.”55 To 
the dissatisfaction of the Serbs, the subtle use of the word “also” made clear that the Pope did 
not blame solely the Croats for these “sins”. John Paul II repeatedly expressed his desire to 
visit Belgrade, but neither he nor his two successors so far did.  
The Muslims in the Serbian Sandžak―who in general now call themselves 
Bosniaks―represent a greater challenge to the Serbian state than the Catholics. During the 
war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the local SDA worked for the integration of the Sandžak in 
Bosnia; after the war, some Sandžak-Bosniak politicians were prepared to cooperate with the 
Serbian government, others were less inclined. In 2007 the Islamic Community of the 
Sandžak changed its name into Islamic Community in Serbia (Islamska Zajednica u Srbiji), 
remaining a mešihat (local office) of the Islamic Community in Sarajevo, though. Since 1993, 
when it separated from the Islamic Community of Yugoslavia, the leader has been mufti 
Muamer Zukorlić, an assertive Muslim who campaigns for the recognition of the Sandžak 
Muslims as Bosniaks by the Serbian government. From 1994 on, there has existed also a 
rivalling official Islamic Community of Serbia (Islamska Zajednica Srbije), led by Reis-ul-
ulema Adem Zilkić and covering Serbia without Kosovo, which understandably is not 
recognized by the Islamic Community in Serbia―and vice versa.56  
Since 1993, an Islamic Community of Kosovo (Bashkësia Islame e Kosovës) has defended the 
interests of the Kosovan (Albanian and Slav) Muslims. To complete the picture, mention 
should be made of a Council of the Islamic Community of Kosovo for Preševo, Bujanovac 
and Medveđa, founded in 1971, which is subordinated to the Islamic Community in Serbia. In 
addition in 2003, an Islamic Community for Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa was founded, 
which is part of the Islamic Community of Serbia.
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Macedonia after the 2001 Ohrid Agreement offers a rare example of ethno-religious 
community, the Muslim Albanians that received an equal status with the majority ethno-
religious community, the Orthodox Macedonians. This was due to de mediation of the 
international community during the negotiations on the Ohrid Agreement and is much to the 
dissatisfaction of the majority group. 
People belonging to a minority religious community are not by definition subjected to 
discrimination, but there can fall victim to considerable social pressure and ostracism as they 
are considered as not fully belonging to the nation and potentially disloyal to it. People who 
belong to such a minority religious community or have a spouse from an other ethnic origin or 
are born in an ethnically-mixed family may escape unfair treatment opting for one of the 
small, new or traditional Protestant churches that do not belong to one particular nation. In the 
Serb populated region of the Croat Banovina, Orthodox Christians occasionally join the 
Baptist church― in the same way as they previously used to declare themselves “Yugoslavs” 
instead of Croats or Serbs.
58
 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the relations with minor religious communities are regulated by the 
constitution, which came with the Dayton Agreement. Eager to regulate the relations between 
Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, the authors of the Agreement overlooked that there are still other 
ethnic/religious groups in the country. In 2006, the Roma Dervo Sjdić and the Jew Jakob 
Finci, both being constitutionally ineligible to the Presidency and the House of Peoples of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, started a lawsuit with the European Court for Human Rights. The latter 
in 2009 decided that the provision was discriminatory, as a result of which the Bsonian 
Parliament initiated a constitutional reform. To some Bosniak politicans (among whom late 
Izetbegović), the relations of the Muslim community with the Orthodox and Catholic 
communities might appropriately be based on the Islamic or Ottoman tradition of the dhimma 
in a modern version.
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 According to the concept of the dhimma, the Muslim majority or 
dominant group offers protection to Christians and Jews (so-called ahl al-kitab, “People of the 
Book”) in exchange for submission. Bernard Lewis and Benjamin Braude in their 
authoritative Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire define dhimma more adequately as 
“discrimination without persecution”.60 Not surprisingly this Muslim approach to “religious 
pluralism” failed to inspire confidence to people that remembered the dhimma as the “Turkish 
yoke”.  
Some groups like the Torbešes and the Gorani, Slav Muslims in Macedonia and Kosovo 
respectively, hesitate giving prevalence to their ethnic or religious affiliation. However, as 
their leaning towards a “Turkish” identity suggests, the latter identification seems after all to 
predominate. 
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Ecclesiastical “territorial conflicts” 
 
A particular aspect of the churches involvement in nationalist struggles represents the issue of 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction. There are no disagreements among the Catholic archbishoprics of 
Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina concerning the jurisdiction over their dioceses. 
The borders between these dioceses have been established centuries ago by the Vatican in 
accordance with the then political borders. The Patriarchate of Serbia, however, has serious 
disagreements with the recently (re)established churches of Montenegro and Macedonia. 
The Montenegrin Church was founded in 1217 as a diocese of the autocephalous church of 
Serbia and promoted to the rank of metropolitanate in 1346, when the Serbian church became 
a separate patriarchate. In 1463, most Serbian dioceses passed under the jurisdiction of the 
Patriarchate of Constantinople; the Metropolitanate of Montenegro though was assigned to the 
Autocephalous Archbishopric of Ohrid. In 1553, it passed again under the jurisdiction of the 
reestablished Patriarchate of Peć. After the latter was abolished in 1766, the Metropolitanate 
of Montenegro was not included into the Patriarchate of Constantinople as the other Serbian 
dioceses, but became an autonomous Montenegrin church with seat in Cetinje, ruled, from the 
beginning of the 18
th
 century on, by prince-bishops from the Montenegrin Njegoš dynasty. 
After Montenegro was absorbed by the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenia in 1918, the 
Metropolitanate of Montenegro (extended with two dioceses at the coast, whence the addition 
“and the Littoral” to its name) merged with the Patriarchate of Serbia. In the 1993, 
Montenegrin nationalists working for Montenegrin independence, referring to the autonomy 
of the Metropolitanate of Montenegro in the period from 1766 to 1920, unilaterally 
reestablished the Montenegrin Orthodox Church. According to the Patriarchate of Serbia, 
however, the Metropolitanate of Montenegro might have been autonomous de facto, but 
canonically had always belonged to the Serbian Patriarchate. The Metropolitan of 
Montenegro, Amfilohije (1991- ), from 2007 to 2009 also performing the duties of the 
bedbound Patriarch Pavle, is a politically active Serbian nationalist who strongly opposes the 
establishment of an independent Montenegrin Church. The issue has turned into a major bone 
of contention between the pro-Montenegrin Liberal Union of Montenegro and the pro-Serbian 
Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro, and between Montenegrin nationalists and pro-
Serbian Montenegrins in general.  
An application for the registration of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church was duly submitted 
to the Montenegrin authorities and was granted in 2000. The initiative had been backed by 
several Montenegrin politicians, among whom president Milo Đukanović himself. In 2006, 
after Montenegrin gained independence, the Montenegrin Church finally split from the 
Serbian Patriarchate. Currently, both churches―the Montenegrin Orthodox Church and the 
Serbian Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral―exist juxtaposedly, which causes 
serious problems, all the more so as the new Montenegrin Church claims the properties of the 
Metropolitanate, that means of the Serbian Patriarchate. For the time being, none of the other 
Orthodox patriarchates in the world has recognized the Montenegrin Church, as is canonically 
required. Moreover, the Serbian Patriarchate still seems to enjoy a considerable moral 
authority, not only among the many Montenegrins with a Serb national consciousness. The 
credibility of the Montenegrin Church has been somehow damaged by the questionable 
biography of its leader, Metropolitan Mihailo (1996- ), who was excommunicated by the 
Serbian and the Constantinopolitan Patriarchates (allegedly for adultery, embezzlement and 
insubordination) in 1995 and was ordained in 1998 by patriarch Pimen of an equally 
canonically unrecognized alternative Bulgarian Orthodox church.
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The Serbian Patriarchate is involved in a similar conflict in Macedonia. From the beginning of 
the 11
th
 century until 1767, there existed an Autocephalous Archbishopric of Ohrid. In 1767, 
its dioceses were included into the Patriarchate of Constantinople; in 1913, after the Balkan 
Wars, the dioceses on Serbian territory became a part of the Serbian Patriarchate. After a 
Republic of Macedonia was created within the Tito’s federal Yugoslavia in 1944, Macedonian 
nationalists demanded the restoration of a Macedonian church in the form of the restored 
Autocephalous Archbishopric of Ohrid. In 1958, the creation of a Macedonian church, led by 
an “Archbishop of Ohrid and Skopje and Metropolitan of Macedonia”, was officially 
proclaimed. This could not happen without the support of the Yugoslav communist 
government, which obviously tried to curtail the mighty Serbian patriarchate. In 1967, the 
Macedonian church leader assumed the title of “Archbishop of Ohrid and Macedonia”, 
explicitly claiming independence on the same footing as the Patriarch of Serbia. The 
Patriachate of Serbia refused to recognize the Macedonian Church, as did any other Orthodox 
patriarchate in the world.
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After the Republic of Macedonia became an independent state in 
1992, negotiations about a canonical recognition were started between the Serbian and 
Macedonian church and state leaders, but to no avail. In 2002, an agreement reached in Niš, 
leaving only a symbolic authority of the Serbian patriarchate over the Macedonian church, 
was eventually rejected by the Macedonian side. This created a new and even more 
complicated situation, reminding of the deadlock in Montenegro: in addition to the 
Macedonian Orthodox Church, supported by the government in Skopie, the Patriarchate of 
Serbia created its own autonomous Archbishopric of Ohrid, with seat in Niže Pole near 
Bitola, which was to administer the dioceses of the Serbian patriarchate in Macedonia. 
Archbishop Jovan of the Serbian Ohrid Archbishopric has been considered a traitor by the 
Macedonian Orthodox Church and has frequently been harassed by the Macedonian 
authorities.
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Actually, both conflicts are complicated canonical questions in which both sides have valid 
arguments. However, the Serbian view goes against the Orthodox tradition of state churches, 
especially after Macedonia and Montenegro gained independence, in 1992 and 2006 
respectively. Moreover, both the Macedonian and to a lesser extent the Montenegrin church 
have a long historical traditions that support their claims. Neither the Macedonians, nor the 
Montenegrins (at least the majority of them) are Serbs. It seems as if the idea of a Greater 
Serbia has somehow survived in the territorial aspirations of the Serbian Patriarchate.  
 
Instead of a conclusion 
 
Since the end of the 1980s, the number of believers in Yugoslavia and later in the Yugoslav 
successor states has spectacularly increased. While the number of non-believers amounted to 
31,6% in 1987, in 2002 only 2,7% of the overall population of the Yugoslav successor states 
declared to be atheists or not religious, and the number of “atheists/not religious”, as they 
were labeled in the inquiries, would have been almost zero, if there were not 13,8% of them in 
Slovenia and 5% in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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 This sudden increase of religiosity cannot be 
explained exclusively by the need of spirituality after four decades of allegedly compulsory 
atheism. Widespread atheism or agnosticism or lukewarm believe in “some power” was a 
result not so much of communist propaganda, but mainly, as in Western Europe, of 
modernization, materialism and consumerism in a legally secularized society. What really 
occurred in the late 1980s and the 1990s, during the process of disintegration of the 
multinational federal Yugoslavia and the creation of new ethnic nation states, was that 
religion turned into what Mirko Blagojević calls a “defensive, integrative, homogenizing 
means of ethnic mobilization” (zaštitno-integrativna, homogenizujuća, etnomobilišuća 
funkcija religije).
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 This was in particular the case with Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, between 
whom religion was the chief national distinctive feature. Whenever, though, as among 
Slovenes and Kosovars, religion was redundant as a national distinctive feature―because 
language served that purpose― it occupied a much more modest place in national identity 
building and consequently in politics and society in general. The seeming increase of 
religiosity was due to the fact that displaying religious belief and participating in religious 
practices was regarded as an expression of ethnic belonging and a token of loyalty to the 
nation. As Paul Mojzes phrased it in the previous chapter in this volume, religion was a 
question of “belonging rather than believing and/or practicing.” Sometimes the term “cultural 
religiosity” is used to denote this massive, but rather declarative belonging to a religious 
community, while the number of churchgoers and authentic believers remains limited.
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Although reliable figures are hard to obtain and often contradict each other, there appear to be 
considerable discrepancies between the number of self-declared Catholics, Orthodox 
Christians and Muslims and the number of people who declare to believe in God and to 
follow the teachings and commandments of their faith. The number of churchgoers (on 
Sundays, on special occasions as Eastern and Christmas) is easier to establish, but not very 
reliable as in the case of mass attendance especially in small rural communities social 
pressure plays an important part. Anyhow, in the early 1990s, 92,8% of the Serbs in Serbia 
thought of themselves as religious. While in 2010 77,9% of the population of Serbia declared 
to be Orthodox Christians, only 63,2% believed that “a God” exists and only 27,8 declared to 
unreservedly believe in the doctrine of their church. Tellingly, close to 39,1% labeled 
themselves as “traditional believers” (tradicionalni vernik), who “participates in some rituals 
of his faith and observe its customs, but is not active in her/his religious community”.68 The 
concept of a “traditional believer”, however, seems to suggest also that the historical bond 
with national religious traditions prevails over authentic religiosity. In Croatia too, the number 
of “real” believers is much lower than that of the self-declared Catholics.69 In fact, surfing the 
wave of nationalism, Catholic, Muslim, and Orthodox religious institutions themselves 
contributed to reducing religiosity to a mere component of national identity, instead of 
elevating it to a genuinely ecumenical source of spirituality and morality. 
All this is not to minimize the number of people who feel a genuine need for a spiritual 
dimension in their lives. In this respect the relative revival of monastic life among Croats and 
Serbs is indicative.
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 However, cloisters and monasteries are often perceived as strongholds of 
the national identity as well. Some people in search for an apostolic Christianity turn to the 
neo-Protestant churches that had not compromised themselves with nationalism and worldly 
power. Moreover, one may assume that as a result of the religious instruction in schools the 
number of religious people is growing and largely compensates for those who after the ebbing 
away of nationalist fervour inevitably display less religious zeal. 
Religious authorities of whatever creed in the Yugoslav successor states defend traditional 
family values. They prefer the role of women in society to be limited to the kids and the 
kitchen and condemn homosexuality, gay marriages, and abortion.
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 Although they seem to 
have the approval of a large segment of the population, they nevertheless stimulate 
conservatism and intolerance in political and social life. The problem, as Richard Farkas 
points out, is partly in the contradiction between religion and democracy. “At its roots, classic 
liberal democracy is grounded in the idea that man can define and pursue his interests in the 
framework of a tolerant and constrained political community. Religion, in point of fact, is a 
necessarily prescriptive and standard-setting phenomenon supported by a hierarchy with 
unyielding confidence in its own perceptions. (…) The various peoples of Southeast Europe 
have come to recognize this discrepancy and have articulated their concern about the intimacy 
of church and state and the destination that that portends for society. Their instincts tell them 
that the church may prevail and, in doing so, neutralize the effort to develop democratic forms 
of politics.”72  
However, none of the Yugoslav successor states unquestioningly follows the programme of 
their religious leaders. Whether by personal conviction or under pressure of international 
institutions, politicians are prepared to take into account the secularist reserves that many 
people foster concerning too powerful a role for the religious institutions in the state. 
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